India’s Defence Sector Faces Intellectual Property Ownership Challenges Amid Push for Self-Reliance

India’s longstanding pursuit of self-sufficiency in defence manufacturing continues to be constrained by a complex intellectual property rights (IPR) challenge. Although the nation aims for technological sovereignty through indigenisation efforts under the Atmanirbharta banner, its defence industrial base (DIB) remains heavily dependent on foreign designs, licensed production agreements, and externally controlled technologies.

At the core of this issue is the distinction between owning a military platform and owning the intellectual property embedded within it. IPR encompasses not only patents and trademarks but also design data, source codes, engineering drawings, manufacturing processes, and materials technology. Crucially, it governs how these technologies can be used, modified, shared, and exported.

India frequently manufactures advanced military systems domestically yet lacks ownership of the underlying IPR. This restricts its ability to independently upgrade or commercially exploit these technologies without the consent of foreign rights holders.

Historical fighter aircraft programs exemplify this disconnect. The MiG-21, MiG-27, Jaguar, and Su-30MKI fighter jets, along with the Hawk 132 Advanced Jet Trainer, followed a pattern of increasing domestic manufacturing but limited control over core design architectures. For instance, the Su-30MKI combines a Russian airframe and propulsion system with Indian mission computers, French navigation systems, and Israeli targeting and electronic warfare technologies. Despite this integration, India does not own the fundamental intellectual property behind these components.

This has fostered expertise in system integration and adaptation—often described as India’s ‘jugaad’ innovation—but has not translated into originating critical technologies.

The now-defunct Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) project with Russia further underscores the IPR challenges. Initiated in 2007 to co-develop a variant of Russia’s Sukhoi Su-57 stealth fighter, the project was led by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) on the Indian side. HAL sought co-development and shared IPR ownership, but disagreements over technology access, workshare, and transparency led to India’s withdrawal around 2017-18 after investing approximately US$295 million.

The FGFA’s collapse highlights the difficulty of acquiring meaningful IPR through foreign collaboration. Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force reportedly considers procuring Su-57 squadrons as an interim measure, underscoring the gap between acquiring operational capability and owning the underlying technology.

India’s indigenous Tejas fighter program illustrates both progress and limitations. Designed by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and manufactured by HAL, Tejas represents a significant domestic achievement in combat aircraft design and systems integration. However, it relies on critical foreign-origin components such as US-made General Electric F404IN20 engines, British Martin-Baker ejection seats, Israeli radar and electronic warfare systems, and various imported avionics.

Consequently, while India can modify and operate Tejas with relative freedom, it remains constrained by the embedded foreign technologies. Tejas thus embodies substantial but incomplete design sovereignty—an Indian-designed fighter with partial IPR ownership but dependent on external technologies for key functions.

Rotary-wing platforms show a somewhat more encouraging trajectory. The Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) and its variants—the armed Rudra, Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) Prachand, and naval ALH Mk III—feature higher levels of indigenous design and development. Yet, they still depend on externally sourced or co-developed technologies, notably the Shakti engine derived from France’s Safran Ardiden powerpack, along with transmissions, avionics, and specialized components.

Armoured vehicles also reflect this pattern. Licensed production of T-72 and T-90 tanks built domestic manufacturing capacity but did not transfer design ownership. The indigenously designed Arjun main battle tank, often cited as a symbol of self-reliance, depends on the German-origin MTU Friedrichshafen MB 838 Ka-501 1,400 hp powerpack and Renk transmission. The MB 838 engine is no longer produced, with MTU now part of Rolls-Royce Power Systems, illustrating how reliance on foreign subsystems can jeopardize future sustainability.

Similarly, Indian-built warships, including aircraft carriers, rely on imported propulsion systems, gas turbines, sensors, radars, and combat-management suites. While the steel and shipyards are local, many critical technologies originate abroad, limiting full indigenous control.

Across multiple defence domains, India continues to grapple with the transition from “build-to-print” manufacturing to “design-and-own” technological sovereignty. The persistent IPR dilemma remains a significant barrier to achieving true self-reliance in defence capabilities.