On 26 June 2026, the Constitutional Court of South Africa issued its landmark judgment in Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Constitutionality of the Copyright Amendment Bill and the Performers’ Protection Amendment Bill (CCT 306/24). This historic decision marks the first occasion the Court has conducted an abstract review of a bill’s substance prior to its enactment, underscoring the constitutional significance of the case. The law firm Adams & Adams acted as amicus curiae for the seventh party in the proceedings.
The case centered on the constitutionality of copyright exceptions proposed in the Copyright Amendment Bill B13F of 2017, which sought to amend the Copyright Act of 1978. These exceptions define circumstances under which copyrighted works may be used without permission or remuneration to rights holders.
Although Parliament passed the Bill in 2024 and forwarded it to President Cyril Ramaphosa for signature, the President referred the copyright exceptions to the Constitutional Court. His referral expressed concerns that the exceptions might constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property, violating the Bill of Rights.
The Court affirmed that copyright qualifies as protected property under the Constitution. It upheld the constitutionality of the Bill’s shift from the existing “fair dealing” exceptions to a broader “fair use” framework. The Court found that, based on the President’s referral and the text of the fair use clause, this policy shift does not amount to arbitrary deprivation.
Similarly, the Court upheld various new exceptions for personal use, translation, educational institutions, and cultural institutions such as libraries, archives, museums, and galleries. These exceptions are designed to replace most of the existing exceptions in the current Act.
However, the Court struck down sections 12D(1)–(5) of the Bill, which contained broad exceptions allowing educational institutions to copy textbooks. The majority held these provisions unconstitutional, reasoning that they exceeded what was necessary to achieve public benefit, lacked precise definitions of key terms, and unfairly shifted the financial burden of public education onto individual authors and rights holders rather than the state.
Justice Steven Majiedt dissented, arguing that the majority undervalued constitutional rights to education, equality, and access to knowledge, and that he would have upheld the textbook copying exceptions.
Because these sections were declared unconstitutional, the President is barred from signing the Bill into law until Parliament remedies the defect.
Beyond the President’s referral, several interested parties and amici curiae highlighted other potentially unconstitutional provisions. These included a time limit on copyright assignments effectively restricting exploitation to 25 years, ministerial powers to prescribe essential contract terms, a contract override provision limiting contractual freedom, onerous reporting requirements discriminating against companies, and possible removal of performers’ rights.
The Court clarified that its constitutional findings apply narrowly to the provisions raised by the President and do not constitute a permanent endorsement of the Bill’s constitutionality. Ordinary constitutional challenges remain available once the Bill is enacted.
Importantly, the Court interpreted the upheld exceptions narrowly to prevent unconditional deprivation of property. It ruled that the phrase “such as” preceding the list of permitted purposes in the fair use clause does not permit unrestricted use of copyrighted works. The substitution-effect factor is a mandatory constraint, and personal use is limited to the individual copier, excluding redistribution even to friends. These interpretive rulings bind future application of the exceptions.
The judgment addresses legislation drafted over a decade ago and does not contemplate generative artificial intelligence (AI), now a critical issue for the creative industries worldwide.
The Court’s constraints on the fair use clause effectively preclude using the Bill’s exceptions as a legal basis for AI machine learning and training data ingestion involving mass reproduction of copyrighted works for commercial AI development. Such uses do not qualify as personal use, nor do they meet the educational or research purposes or pass the substitution-effect test.
Consequently, the fair use clause cannot be interpreted as permitting unrestricted copyright use by technology companies for AI training. However, neither the current Act nor the Bill includes a text and data mining exception or a statutory safe harbor for AI training.
With the constitutional defect identified, Parliament must revisit the Bill. Simply removing the unconstitutional textbook copying provisions and resubmitting the Bill would squander a historic opportunity.
Given the Bill’s origins in a pre-generative AI era, Parliament now faces a rare and urgent chance to commission an independent socio-economic impact assessment. Such an assessment should evaluate the real-world effects of the proposed exceptions and determine whether a legislative framework conceived in 2015 remains fit for purpose in 2026 and beyond.
South Africa’s Constitutional Court Upholds Fair Use but Strikes Down Broad Educational Exceptions in Copyright Amendment Bill On 26 June 2026, South Africa’s Constitutional Court delivered a pivotal judgment on the Copyright Amendment Bill, endorsing the transition from fair dealing to fair use but invalidating broad educational exceptions for... Read the full IIPLA article: https://iipla.org/news/south-africa-s-constitutional-court-upholds-fair-use-but-strikes-down-broad-educational-exceptions-in-copyright-amendment-bill