On October 19, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by Alphabet-owned Google, effectively ending the company’s attempt to revive its patent invalidity challenge against software company VirtaMove through administrative review. The case, Google v. VirtaMove (No. 25-1230), centered not on the validity of the patents themselves but on whether the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) may exercise discretion to refuse institution of inter partes review (IPR) petitions against patents that have been long-standing, invoking the concept of "settled expectations."
Google had filed four IPR petitions in July 2025 targeting two VirtaMove patents that had been in force for over 14 years. The USPTO, exercising its discretion, declined to institute review, citing the patents’ age and the strong "settled expectations" of the patent owner. The agency reasoned that Google had not sufficiently justified the expenditure of Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) resources to revisit these mature patents.
Following the USPTO’s decision, Google sought relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit via a writ of mandamus, arguing that the USPTO’s policy effectively imposed a time limit on IPR petitions that Congress had not authorized. The Federal Circuit denied this request, referencing Section 314(d) of the Patent Act, which limits judicial review of institution decisions. The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the case leaves this ruling intact.
Importantly, the denial does not reflect a judgment on the substantive merits of Google’s prior-art challenges. Rather, Google was never granted the procedural opportunity to have the PTAB consider its petitions. The patent claims themselves remain unchanged, but the procedural landscape for challenging them has shifted.
The discretionary policy at issue originated from a March 26, 2025 memorandum issued by then-Acting USPTO Director Coke Morgan Stewart. The memorandum explicitly separates discretionary considerations from substantive patentability examination and identifies "settled expectations of the parties, such as the length of time the claims have been in force," as a factor in deciding whether to institute review. Notably, the memorandum does not establish a fixed cutoff, such as a six-year limit; this figure was characterized by Google in its petition as a practice observed in subsequent cases, while the government emphasized the absence of a uniform time threshold.
Since October 20, 2025, decisions to institute IPR and post-grant review (PGR) proceedings have been made by USPTO Director John Squires in consultation with at least three PTAB judges. USPTO statistics reveal a marked decline in institution rates for America Invents Act (AIA) trial proceedings, with the overall institution rate by petition dropping to approximately 37% over the past three years.
While the decline in institution rates cannot be solely attributed to the "settled expectations" policy—factors such as case composition and parallel district court litigation also influence outcomes—the trend signals a tightening of the procedural gateway for administrative patent challenges.
Legal disputes over the USPTO’s discretion continue. Intel and Google have separately petitioned the Supreme Court in Intel v. Squires, challenging the NHK–Fintiv framework under which the USPTO may deny institution based on the existence of parallel litigation. This petition remains pending and is distinct from the VirtaMove case; the denial of Google’s petition here does not predict the outcome of the Intel case.
In its filings, Google contended that the USPTO lacks statutory authority to impose a time limit on IPR petitions where Congress has set none, arguing that the agency’s policy unlawfully extends patent rights beyond congressional intent. The Trump administration, however, urged the Supreme Court to decline review.
Between 2020 and 2025, Samsung, Apple, and Alphabet were the most active petitioners before the PTAB. Tech companies have historically relied on IPRs to clear patent obstacles and mitigate infringement risks. The increased threshold for institution alters the cost-benefit calculus of patent defense, potentially increasing litigation expenses and affecting settlement and licensing negotiations.
For non-practicing entities (NPEs), the discretionary denial of institution narrows administrative avenues to challenge patents but does not affect substantive issues of validity, infringement, or damages. The procedural barrier requires defendants to reassess their strategies and resource allocations.
Chinese companies facing U.S. patent risks should consider not only the strength of invalidity arguments but also the likelihood of institution and procedural hurdles. Factors such as patent age, prior challenges, licensing history, and litigation context must be integrated into risk assessments and enforcement strategies.
While the Supreme Court’s denial does not endorse the legality of the "settled expectations" policy, it signals that companies must navigate the current procedural framework. Evaluating a patent’s enforceability now involves assessing not only its technical merits but also the procedural costs and likelihood of successfully initiating administrative review.
The evolving landscape underscores the importance of comprehensive patent portfolio management and strategic planning in U.S. patent litigation and licensing.
Supreme Court Rejects Google’s Challenge to USPTO’s Patent Review Discretion, Impacting IPR Institution Rates The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear Google’s petition challenging the USPTO’s discretionary policy on instituting inter partes reviews (IPRs) of older patents. This decision upholds the Patent Trial and Appeal Board... Read the full IIPLA article: https://iipla.org/news/supreme-court-rejects-google-s-challenge-to-uspto-s-patent-review-discretion-impacting-ipr-institution-rates