Indian Patent Office Incorporates Opponent’s Arguments in Refusal of AI Inventor DABUS Patent Application

In Patent Application No. 202017019068, filed by Stephen L. Thaler, the artificial intelligence system DABUS was named as the inventor of a food container invention. The Indian Patent Office (IPO) issued two separate orders: one refusing the patent application itself and another addressing a pre-grant opposition filed by Dr. Kalyan C. Kankanala.

While the pre-grant opposition was ultimately dismissed, the IPO’s refusal order on the patent application notably incorporates several of the opponent’s statutory, interpretative, and comparative law arguments concerning inventorship and proof of right. These arguments emphasize that the Indian Patents Act, 1970, restricts recognition of inventors to natural persons only.

The refusal order reflects the opponent’s submissions in multiple respects. For instance, it distinguishes between entities entitled to apply for patents and those who may be named as inventors. Although the Act recognises certain non-natural persons, such as the Government and juristic entities, for patent application purposes, inventorship remains confined to natural persons. The opponent argued that naming DABUS as inventor does not permit the applicant to claim benefits extended to corporate applicants, as such extensions do not apply to inventorship. This reasoning appears at page 7, paragraph 10.4 of the refusal order.

Further, the opponent submitted that a combined reading of Sections 6 (persons entitled to apply), 7 (form of application), and 10 (contents of specifications) of the Patents Act presupposes a natural-person inventor. Such an inventor must be capable of holding legal rights, assigning those rights, and being represented posthumously—attributes an AI system like DABUS lacks. These submissions are reflected on page 6, paragraph 10.1 and page 9, paragraph 19 of the refusal order.

The procedural requirements for declaration of inventorship also underpin the refusal. The opponent highlighted that declarations must include particulars such as nationality, address, and signatures, which only a natural person can provide. Machines or AI systems cannot make such declarations or assert legal statuses like nationality. The refusal order echoes this reasoning at page 6, paragraph 10.2.

Regarding statutory definitions, the opponent argued that the negative definition of “true and first inventor” in Section 2(1)(y) must be harmonized with the broader statutory framework. This interpretation confirms that the term “inventor” presupposes a human actor and does not extend to non-humans. The refusal order incorporates this view at page 7, paragraph 10.3 and page 9, paragraph 20.

The opponent also pointed out that while Section 2(1)(s) extends the meaning of “person” to include the Government, it does not expressly extend personhood to machines, AI systems, or technological constructs. Where Parliament has extended personhood beyond natural persons, it has done so explicitly. The refusal order reflects this principle at page 7, paragraph 10.4 and page 10, paragraph 21.

Finally, the opponent submitted that the inventive-step standard under Section 2(1)(ja), assessed from the perspective of a “person skilled in the art,” inherently presupposes a human mind. The statutory framework does not envisage assessing inventive activity originating from an autonomous machine or non-human entity.

This refusal order thus embodies a comprehensive statutory and interpretative approach to AI inventorship in India, aligning with the position that only natural persons qualify as inventors under the Patents Act, 1970. The case underscores ongoing global legal challenges in addressing AI-generated inventions within existing intellectual property frameworks.